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Using the extended Ramsey rule, the socially efficient rate is the difference between a wealth 
effect and a precautionary effect of economic growth. This second effect is increasing in the 
degree of uncertainty affecting the future. In the literature, it is usually calibrated by 
estimating the historical volatility of the growth of GDP in a specific country. In this paper, I 
show that using cross-section data tends to magnify uncertainty, and to reduce the discount 
rate. Using a data set covering 190 countries over the period 1969-2010, I justify using a 
much smaller discount rate around 0.7% per year for time horizons exceeding 40 years. 
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1.  Introduction 
For many thousands of years, since homo-sapiens emerged as the dominant species on earth, 
almost all of their consumption was determined by what they collected or produced over the 
seasonal cycle.  Pressured by Malthus’ Law, humanity remained at a subsistence level for 
thousands of generations. The absence of the notion of private property, or the inadequacy of a 
legal system to guarantee that what an individual saves belongs to them, was a strong incentive to 
consume everything that was produced year after year. But human beings, contrary to most other 
species, are conscious of their own future. At the individual level, a trade-off is made between 
immediate needs and aspirations for a better future. Individual investments can take many forms.  
When young, individuals invest in their human capital. Later on, they save for their retirement. 
They invest in their health by doing sport, brushing their teeth, eating healthy food.  They plan 
their own future and those of their offspring to whom they can bequest the capital they have 
accumulated.  In short, individuals sacrifice some of their immediate pleasures for future benefits.  
Once individual property rights on assets were guaranteed by strong enough governments, the 
potential of individual investments was unlocked.  At the collective level they have generated the 
enormous accumulation of physical and intellectual capital that the western world has experienced 
over the last three centuries. New institutions, like corporations, banks, and financial markets, 
have been created for the governance of these investments. Taken together, this has been a 
powerful engine for economic growth and prosperity. With a real growth rate of GDP per capita 
around 2% per year, the western world now consumes 50 times more goods and services than we 
did 200 years ago.  
States and governments also intervened in this process. They invested in public infrastructures like 
roads, schools, or hospitals. They heavily invested in public research whose scientific discoveries 
quickly diffused in the economy. At the collective level, these public investments diverted some of 
the wealth produced in the economy away from the immediate consumption of non-durable goods.  
The literature on discounting addresses the difficult question of whether the allocation and the 
intensity of these sacrifices in favour of the future are socially efficient or not. Ramsey (1928) 
provides a simple framework to think about this problem. The central piece of the theory is that 
people have a preference for the smoothing of consumption over time, i.e., they have an aversion 
to intertemporal inequalities. In the discounted utility framework, this is modelled through a concave utility function, or a decreasing marginal utility. If one believes in the permanency of 
economic growth, then an intuitive wealth effect prevails in discounting: One should invest in 
favour of the future only if the return of the project is large enough to compensate for the 
increasing intertemporal inequality that this project generates. Under the assumption of a relative 
aversion to intertemporal inequality of 2,
2 the belief in a growth rate of 2% per year implies an 
efficient discount rate of 4%. If one adds a rate of pure preference for the present between 0 and 
2% per year, we obtain the most standard recommendation about the level of the discount rate that 
exists in the literature (Arrow (1999), Weitzman (2007b), Nordhaus (2008)).  
It is intuitive that the uncertainty about the growth rate of the economy should play an important 
role in the determination of the intensity of our sacrifice in favour of the future, i.e., on the level of 
the discount rate. The theory states that the uncertain growth generates a precautionary effect that 
tends to reduce the discount rate. Indeed, prudent agents should invest more when their future 
incomes become more uncertain (Leland (1968), Drèze and Modigliani (1972), Kimball (1990)). 
However, extending the Ramsey rule to uncertainty has initially generated disappointing results 
(Weil (1989), Gollier (2002)). The traditional approach to this problem is to estimate the country-
specific risk on growth by the volatility of the growth rate. When performed on U.S. data, one 
obtains a surprisingly low precautionary effect, which reduces the discount rate by one-tenth of a 
percent. I show in this paper that a similar observation can be made for most developed countries.  
The wealth effect varies much across countries because of the important heterogeneity of the 
average growth rate observed since World War II. It must also be observed that the volatility of 
annual growth rates within each country is also very heterogeneous. I show that the mean 
precautionary effect estimated from the mean volatility of the annual growth rate in 190 countries 
from 1969 to 2010 is around 1%, which is 10 times larger than in the western world. The stability 
of growth is a western phenomenon. Calibrating the Ramsey rule on developed countries tends to 
underestimate the precautionary effect. I show that the average discount rate using the extended 
Ramsey rule for each of the 190 countries under scrutiny is close to 2.5%. Thus, when faced by a 
global bad like global warming, the estimation of the present value of damages by using a discount 
rate of 4% is a mistake, because a large fraction of these damages will be borne by populations 
that face much more uncertainty about their future than in the western world.  
 In Gollier (2008), I have shown that the presence of positive serial correlation in the growth rate 
of the economy tends to magnify the long term uncertainty. Weitzman (2007a) provides an 
                                                            
2 This implies that an increase in consumption by 1% reduces the marginal utility of consumption by 2%. example of this effect in which the uncertainty yields an infinite precautionary effect. In this 
paper, I attack the problem from a different angle. Following Barro (2006), I believe that the 
history of shocks on country-specific economic growth rates provides information about the long 
term uncertainty faced within each country. What has been observed over the last few decades in 
China, Argentina or Russia for example may affect our beliefs about the uncertain growth in our 
own economies. The slow-growing economies of today may become the fast-growing economies 
of tomorrow. In this paper, I use brute statistical force to estimate the uncertainty affecting growth 
by the standard deviation of the growth rate of consumption between 1969 and 2010 among 190 
countries. Because of the important heterogeneity of economic fate across these countries over the 
period under scrutiny, I obtain a much larger precautionary effect than by the standard time-series 
analysis in developed countries. In my calibration, the wealth effect and the precautionary effect 
amount respectively to 4.5% and to -3.8%, yielding a discount rate of 0.7%. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I present the classical Lucas-tree model that 
generates the extended Ramsey rule. Section 3 is devoted to the calibration of this rule by using 
country-specific time-series data. In section 4, I develop the main idea of the paper by considering 
a cross-section analysis of the degree of uncertainty affecting the economic growth process. I 
provide a few concluding remarks in section 5. 
 
2.  The model 
I consider an economy with n agents indexed by i=1,…,n. Agent i  consumes  0 i c at date 0 and 
it c at date t. The growth rate of consumption of agent i  in this period is denoted 
0 log( / ) it it i x cc = . Agents evaluate their intertemporal welfare  i V  by the discounted flow of 
expected utility, with an increasing and concave utility function u, and with a rate of pure 
preference for the present δ : 
  0 () () . ii i t Vu c e E u c
δ − =+  (1) 
We assume that the allocation of consumption across time and states of nature is Pareto-
efficient. This means that there exists a vector of positive Pareto weights  1 ( ,..., ) n λ λ so that this 
allocation maximizes the utilitarian social welfare  ii i WV λ =∑  subject to feasibility constraints. Equivalently, this means that the following necessary and sufficient conditions are 
satisfied:
3 
  11 '( ) '( ) 2,..., , 0, . ii uc uc i n t ττ λ λτ == =  (2) 
Agent i=1 is hereafter identified as the representative agent in this economy. All other agents 
have a marginal utility that is proportional to the representative agent’s marginal utility, in all 
states of nature and at all dates.  
At the collective level, agents contemplate the possibility to transfer consumption through 
time via a safe investment project that reduces all agents’ consumption by ε  at date 0 and that 
increases all agents’ consumption by exp ε ρ at date t. Observe that ρ is the rate of return of 
the project. This project is socially desirable if it raises social welfare 
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at the margin. This is the case if and only if 
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Equivalently, the investment project is socially desirable if its rate of return ρ  is larger than 
































δ =−  (6) 
This is the classical asset pricing formula in the finance literature (see for example Cochrane 
(2001)). Equation (6) is the discount rate that agent i=1 should use to evaluate safe investment 
projects. Because of efficient risk sharing, it is also the discount rate that should be used by all 
other agents in the economy. 
                                                            
3 For more details, see Borch (1962), Wilson (1968) and Gollier (2001). To calibrate formula (6), I specify the utility function of the representative agent and the 
uncertain growth rate of consumption. I assume that relative risk aversion is constant and 













I also assume that the growth rate of consumption  1t x is normally distributed with mean μ and 
variance 
2 σ . It implies that 
 
2
1 (0 . 5 )
11 0 1 0 '( ) .
t x
t Eu c c Ee c e
γ γγ γ μ γ σ − −− − − ==  (8) 
The last equality comes from the well-known fact that the Arrow-Pratt approximation is exact 
when the function is exponential and the risk is normal (see Gollier (2001) for example). 
Combining conditions (6) and (8) yields 
 
22 0.5 . r δ γμ γ σ =+ −  (9) 
It is easier to rewrite this equation as 
 
2 0.5 ( 1) rg δ γγ γ σ =+ − +  (10) 
where 
2
11 0 log / 0.5 t gE c c μ σ == + is the growth rate of expected consumption. Equation (10) 
is often referred to as the “extended Ramsey rule”. It is the cornerstone of most recent papers 
on the discount rate.
4  
Equation (10) shows that the discount rate has three components, expressed by the three terms in 
the right-hand side of this equation. The first component is the rate δ  of pure preference for the 
present, or the rate of impatience. There is no convergence among experts toward an agreed, or 
unique, rate of impatience. Frederick, Loewenstein and O'Donoghue (2002) conducted a meta-
analysis of the literature on the estimation of the rate of impatience. Rates differ dramatically 
across studies and within studies across individuals. For example, Warner and Pleeter (2001), who 
examined actual households’ decisions between an immediate down-payment and a rental 
payment, found that individual discount rates vary between 0% and 70% per year!  However, the 
general view is that a small or zero discount rate should be used when the flow of utility over time 
is related to different generations. The fact that I discount my own felicity next year by 2% does 
                                                            
4 See for example Gollier (2002), Weitzman (2007a, b), and Gollier and Weitzman (2010). not mean that I should discount my children’s felicity next year by 2%. In fact, there is no moral 
reason to value the utility of future generations less than the utility of the current ones. As 
explained by Broome (1992), good at one time should not be treated differently from good at 
another, and the impartiality about time is a universal point of view. The normative doctrine is that 
the rate of time preference is zero. In later sections, this book takes a normative stand to set δ  at 
zero.  This is justified because the dominant role of the discount rate over the longer term is to 
allocate utility across different generations rather than within an individual’s lifetime. 
The second component  is the wealth effect. In a growing economy, the marginal utility of 
consumption will be smaller in the future. This justifies using a positive discount rate. One 
should invest for the future only if the rate of return of the project is large enough to 
compensate for the increased intertemporal inequality that this investment generates. The 
wealth effect  g γ is increasing in the growth rate of consumption and in the speed at which 
marginal utility decreases when consumption increases. The sum of the impatience effect and 
the wealth effect is the discount rate under certainty that has been derived by Ramsey (1928). 
There is no consensus on the intensity γ  of relative aversion to intertemporal inequality. Using 
estimates of demand systems, Stern (1977) found a concentration of estimates of γ  around 2 with 
a range of roughly 0-10. Hall (1988) found an γ  around 10, whereas Epstein and Zin (1991) found 
a value ranging from 1.25 to 5 . Pearce and Ulph (1995) estimate a range from 0.7 to 1.5. 
Following Stern (1977) and the author’s own introspection, we will hereafter consider γ =2 as a 
reasonable value, together with a rate of impatience  0% δ = . 
The third component of the social discount rate is the precautionary effect, which is given by 
the last term in the right-hand side of equation (10). It characterizes the potentially important 
role of uncertainty in the determination of the optimal effort to improve that future. As 
suggested by the intuition, it is negative: the precautionary effect tends to reduce the discount 
rate, thereby inducing the community to invest more for the future. This is the collective 
parallel to the old Keynesian concept of the precautionary saving motive: the uncertainty 
surrounding future incomes induces consumers to save more. Leland (1968) and Drèze and 
Modigliani (1972) have shown that this is true in the classical discounted expected utility 
model if and only if marginal utility is convex in consumption, i.e., if  ''' u  is positive. Indeed, 
under this condition of prudence (Kimball (1990)),  1 '( ) t Eu c  is increased by the uncertainty, 
thereby reducing r in equation (6). Kimball (1990) shows that the precautionary effect is equivalent to a sure reduction of consumption that is approximately equal to half  the variance 
of future risk times the index of convexity of marginal utility. In this multiplicative context 
with a power utility function, this index of relative prudence is equal to relative risk aversion 
plus one, or  1 γ + . Equation (10) shows that the effect of uncertainty is indeed equivalent to 
reducing the growth rate of expected consumption g by the precautionary premium 
2 0.5( 1) γ σ + . 
Notice that the discount rate r characterized by equation (10) is the minimum total return over 
period [0,t], exactly as gis the expected rate of growth of consumption in that period, and 
2 σ is the variance of this random variable. If one is interested in annualized rates, one should 
divide r by t, if the unit of time is the year. Observe that this discount rate will be invariant to 
the time horizon t if we assume that the annual growth rate of consumption has no serial 
correlation. Indeed, in that case, the first two moments of  0 log( / ) it it i x cc =  are proportional to 
t, so that r is independent of t. This illustrates the fact that the term structure of the discount 
rate is flat when the growth rate of consumption is a random walk and the relative risk 
aversion is constant (Gollier, 2002).  
 
3.  Calibration using time series of specific countries 
Kocherlakota (1996), using United States annual data over the period 1889-1978, estimated the 
mean g  and the standard deviation σ  of the growth of consumption per capita to be respectively 
1.8% and 3.6% per year. Assuming normality, this means that there is a 95% probability that the 
actual growth rate of consumption next year will be between -5% and +9%. It yields a wealth 
effect of 3.6% and a precautionary effect of -0.39%, implying a discount rate of 3.21%.  
In the remainder of this paper, we use a data set of real historical GDP per capita extracted from 
the Economic Research Service (ERS) International Macroeconomic Data Set provided by the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). This set contains the real GDP/cap expressed in 
dollars of 2005 for 190 countries for each year from 1969 to 2010. If we limit the analysis to the 
United States, the first two moment of the growth rate of GDP/cap over the period has been 
respectively g=1.74% and  2.11% σ = . It yields a wealth effect of 3.48% and a precautionary 
effect of -0.13%, implying a discount rate of 3.35%. The U.S. economy has been less unstable 
during the last four decades than during the period examined by Kocherlakota, thereby reducing the intensity of the precautionary effect. This has a positive impact on the estimated discount rate. 
We have performed the same exercise for other countries. Our results are summarized in Table 1. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
We see that we obtain the same order of magnitude for the wealth effect and the precautionary 
effect for other developed countries like France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. For Japan, 
the mean growth rate and the volatility have been larger, yielding a net positive effect with a 
discount rate around 4.5%. The picture is quite different for emerging countries, which by 
definition experienced a much larger growth rate of consumption. The most striking example is 
China, with a mean annual growth rate of around 7.5% per year, and a relatively large volatility 
around 4%. The calibration of the extended Ramsey rule (10) with these parameter values yields a 
discount rate as large as 14.82%. If one believes that this growth is sustainable, intertemporal 
inequality aversion and the associated wealth effect should induce the Chinese authorities to limit 
their safe investments to projects having a rate of return above this large discount rate. 
At the other extreme of the spectrum is the set of countries which have experienced low growth 
rates. The worst example is Zaire (RDC), with an awful mean growth rate of -2.76% per year over 
the last 4 decades. If one believes that this negative growth trend is persistent, a negative discount 
rate of -6.38% should be used to evaluate safe projects in that country. Liberia provides another 
example of a country with a negative discount rate. In this country, the volatility of the growth rate 
has been extremely large, with σ  equalling 19.58%. This implies a precautionary effect around -
11.5%. Combining that with a wealth effect of -3.8%, I obtain a socially efficient discount rate for 
Liberia around -15%.  
The important differences in growth outcomes among the 190 countries present in the ERS/USDA 
data set over the last 4 decades make it difficult to draw general conclusions about the discount 
rate. In Table 2, I summarize the calibration of the extended Ramsey rule on the basis of the mean 
wealth and precautionary effects among the 1990 countries of the data set. 
Mean wealth effect 
Mean precautionary effect 
3.54% per year 
-1.00% per year 
Mean discount rate  2.54% per year 
Table 2: The mean discount rate among the time series of the 190 countries 
In Figure 1, we draw the frequency graph for the wealth effect and the discount rate. It is 
noteworthy that the precautionary effect tends to be much smaller in developed countries, because of the more efficient stabilizing policies put in place in these countries. This is an important reason 
for the relatively larger discount rates that are efficient in the western world. Precautionary 
investment is a substitute to macroeconomic stabilizing policies.  
This exercise in which we apply the extended Ramsey rule (10) to each individual country relies 
on the assumption that risks are efficiently shared within each country, so that the volatility of the 
growth of GDP/cap is the right measure of uncertainty born by all citizens within that country. By 
the power of imagination, suppose that risks are efficiently shared at the level of the entire world, 
so that the growth of world GDP/cap is the right measure of consumption growth of all human 
beings on the earth. Expectations about the future can be inferred from the first two moments of 
the growth of world GDP/cap over the last three decades. Using the same data set, we obtain by 
pure chance that the mean and the volatility of the real growth rate of world GDP/cap are equal to 
1.41%. This yields a wealth effect and a precautionary effect of respectively 2.82% and -0.06%, 
implying a discount rate of 2.76%. Because country-specific risks are washed out through 
international diversification, the   small precautionary effect reflects the low systematic risk at the 
aggregate level. 
However, this exercise has no economic meaning because it is clear that credit and risk-sharing 
markets do not work efficiently at the international level. Except in a few integrated economic 
unions like in Europe, there is little international solidarity across borders. Thus, condition (2) 
does not hold when agents are identified as countries. For example, a necessary condition for (2) is 
that consumption levels for different agents are comonotone. This excludes the possibility that one 
country be in recession and another country be in expansion at the same time. In fact, efficient 
markets would imply the law of one price, or the existence of a single discount rate at the world 
level. Table 1 and Figure 1 clearly demonstrate that this property of a single discount rate does not 
hold.  
To sum up our results in this section based on a time series analysis of country-specific economic 
growth, one must admit that the precautionary effect remains a marginal component in the 
estimation of the socially efficient discount rate. For the western world, the precautionary effect is 
generally smaller than a quarter of a percent, and is close to 0.1% for countries like the United 
States, France, the United Kingdom and Germany. This is because of the low volatility of their 
economic growth observed during the last 4 decades. This precautionary effect is marginal 
compared to the usually much larger wealth effect equalling two times the anticipated growth rate.  
However, this conclusion of the limited role of uncertainty to determine the intensity of our sacrifices in favour of the future does not hold for developing countries. Many of them have 
experienced a huge volatility of their growth rate during the same period. This suggests that the 
discount rate that should be used in these countries should be smaller than in the western world, 
even in the case of similar expectations on the trend of economic growth. 
 
4.  Calibration using cross-section data 
In the previous section, we made the assumption that each country faces its own stochastic growth 
process characterized by a random walk for the annual growth rate of consumption with known 
country-specific mean and volatility. This implies a flat term structure of the country-specific 
discount rate at a level defined by equation (10). 
If we take a more long term perspective, one must recognize that growth processes undergo 
persistent shocks, or that they are subject to long-lasting cycles covering several decades. Contrary 
to what is implicitly assumed in the above computations, it is indeed hard to believe that China 
will be able to stay permanently with a trend of growth around 8% per year, or that Zaire will 
permanently face an expected growth rate of -2.7% per year. Based on this idea, I propose to 
consider an alternative modeling of growth risk than the one that is classically considered in the 
literature, as illustrated in the previous section. In the spirit of Kondratiev waves ranging from 
forty to sixty years in length, let us consider the abstract stochastic growth process in which each 
country-specific growth rate is reset every 41 years, as was the case in early 1969 and early 2011. 
To be more precise, let us assume that each country-specific change in log consumption  41 i x is 
drawn from the same worldwide “urn” which is normally distributed with mean 
2 0.5 g μ σ =−  and 
volatility σ . This allows us to use again equation (10) to estimate the socially efficient rate r  at 
which cash flows occurring in 2052 should be discounted at the end of 2010.
5 In this framework, 
all countries should use the same discount rate ex ante. 
The observation of the change in log consumption between 1969 and 2010 in the 190 countries of 
the ERS/USDA data set allows us to estimate the first two moments of random variable  41 i x . In 
Figure 2, we draw the frequency graph of   41 2010 1969 log( / ) i xc c = . The mean and the volatility of 
41 i x  are respectively equal to μ =65.74% and σ =72.18%. It yields a growth rate of expected 
                                                            
5 Observe that in this model, the term structure of the discount rate will be decreasing, as shown by Gollier and 
Weitzman (2010). This is due to the important persistence of country-specific shocks to consumption growth that 
we assume in this stochastic model. consumption equalling 
2 0.5 g μ σ =+ =91.79%, or 2.24% per year. The calibration of the extended 





4.48% per year 
-3.81% per year 
Discount rate  27.29%  0.67% per year 
Table 3: The discount rate using the cross-section approach over period 1969-2010 
Focusing on the annualized rates, two conclusions should be drawn from these results when tables 
2 and 3 are compared. First, the relatively large growth rate of expected consumption in this model 
implies a large wealth effect in the Ramsey rule. But the precautionary effect is also large, 
amounting to almost 4% per year. Remember that the mean level of the precautionary effect that 
we documented in the previous section was only 1%. This huge difference in the precautionary 
effect when using a cross-sectional approach rather than the traditional time-series approach 
comes from the important heterogeneity in the country-specific growth rates observed during the 
last 4 decades. In other words, there is more volatility across countries than through time.  
The bottom line is a small discount rate at 0.67% per year. If one believes in the existence of 
random persistent shocks to growth, which is what the data set suggests, then the existing 
literature on discounting is misleading in recommending a discount rate around 3-6%. My 
punchline here is that this literature based on relatively short time series data tends to vastly 
underestimate the risk of regime switches in country-specific economic growth. This implies that 
this literature largely overestimates the rate at which distant cash flows should be discounted. 
One can test the robustness of this analysis by performing two different sensitivity analyses. I first 
consider the shortening of the data set to period 1969-1990. The first two empirical moments of 
1990 1969 log( / ) ccare  μ =32.03% and σ =48.94%. Table 4 summarizes the calibration of the 





4.19% per year 
-3.42% per year 
Discount rate  16.15%  0.77% per year 
Table 4: The discount rate using the cross-section approach over period 1969-1990 
The differences with respect to the analysis covering the entire data set are not significant.  In this model, I treat all countries symmetrically, from China to Samoa. One may want to provide 
a larger probability weight to the elements of the 1969-2010 sample corresponding more heavily 
populated countries. I hereafter report the calibration of the Ramsey rule in which the outcome 
0 log( / ) it i ccreceives a probability weight  1990 1990 / ij j pp ∑ , where  1990 i p is the population in 
country i in year 1990. Under this assumption, we obtain μ =137.39% and σ =102.37%. The 





9.26% per year 
-7.67% per year 
Discount rate  65.16%  1.59% per year 
Table 5: The discount rate using the population-weighted cross-section approach over period 
1969-2010 
Because of the presence of China in the sample, the population-weighted cross-sectional 
calibration of the extended Ramsey rule has a large wealth effect and a large precautionary effect. 
When comparing these results to Table 3, the net effect of the weighting of the country-specific 
growth of consumption by the population is to raise the annualized discount rate from 0.67% to 
1.59%.  
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
The recent literature on discounting is based on the extended Ramsey rule, which combines a 
wealth effect and a negative precautionary effect. The wealth effect is proportional to the expected 
growth rate of consumption, whereas the precautionary effect is quadratic in its volatility. The 
standard calibration of the Ramsey rule relies on the estimation of past mean and volatility of 
economic growth, in general using U.S. data. I have shown that using this approach for most 
developed countries yields a discount rate around 3.5% per year. The effect of uncertainty is small, 
with a precautionary effect usually smaller than 0.25% for this set of countries.  
However, if we consider the entire sample of 190 countries, we obtain that the precautionary effect 
is much larger in absolute value in many other countries. The extreme case is Liberia, for which 
the precautionary effect reduces the discount rate by as much as 11.5%. The average precautionary 
effect among the 190 countries of the sample is 1%. The average discount rate among the 190 
countries is 2.5% An alternative approach to calibrate the Ramsey rule is to assume that the economic growth of 
each country observed between 1969 and 2010 represents one independent draw from the same 
distribution. I have shown that using this cross-section approach à la Barro yields a much larger 
precautionary effect due to the important heterogeneity of growth rates across countries. Under 
this approach, the wealth effect amounts to 4.5%, but the precautionary effect reduces this by 
3.8%, yielding a socially efficient discount rate of 0.7% per year. Thus, the existing literature 
tends to vastly overestimate the socially efficient discount rate. 
I conclude this paper by providing a few remarks about this result. First, it provides an alternative 
solution to the so-called risk-free rate puzzle (Weil, 1989). This puzzle is based on the observation 
that the classical consumption-based pricing model à la Lucas yields an interest rate around 4%, 
which is much larger than the average real interest rate around 1% observed in the United States 
during the last century. American consumers may establish their beliefs about the growth of 
incomes in the United States not only by observing past growth rates in the country, but also by 
taking account of experiences in other countries around the world.  Barro (2006) made a similar 
point, but by focusing on extreme events only. 
Second, it must be noticed that the discount rate derived from the Ramsey rule is independent of 
the initial level of development. This is due to the assumptions of constant relative risk aversion, 
and of the absence of serial correlation in growth rates. Our conclusion would be different if any 
of these two conditions would be relaxed. In Gollier (2011), I examine the role of economic 
convergence in determining the discount rate. I show that economic convergence, i.e., the negative 
correlation between the level of development and the trend of growth, tends to raise the efficient 
discount rate. Indeed, under the veil of ignorance, economic convergence reduces the uncertainty 
affecting consumption in the long term. Mostly due the recent emergence of China, our data set 
clearly exhibits such negative correlation.  
Third, my model governing country-specific grow rates is an over-simplification of the real world. 
It is based on the idea that economic growth is affected periodically by long-lasting shocks that are 
not correctly taken into account by using a time series approach. Still, it is too extreme by 
assuming that the dates at which growth rates are reset are deterministic. In Gollier (2008), I 
examine a two-regime Markov switching model that shares the basic idea with the one examined 
in this paper. But I limit the econometric analysis in this other paper to the United States. A more 
in-depth econometric analysis combining country and time effects remains to be performed. Finally, it must be mentioned that the discount rate should be used to discount real cash flows of 
safe projects. In the real world, most investment projects have uncertain impacts, in particular in 
the distant future. If these impacts are positively correlated to economic growth, the discount rate 
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Table 1: Country-specific discount rate computed from the extended Ramsey rule using the 




Figure 1: Frequency for the wealth effect and the discount rate among the 190 countries, using 




Figure 2: Frequency of  2010 1969 log( / ) ccamong the 190 countries of the ERS data set. 